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Abstract The purpose of this theoretical article is to contribute to the analysis of
knowledge and valuation in markets. In every market actors must know how to value
its products. The analytical point of departure is the distinction between two ideal
types of markets that are mutually exclusive, status and standard. In a status market,
valuation is a function of the status rank orders or identities of the actors on both
sides of the market, which is more entrenched than the value of what is traded in the
market. In a market characterized by a standard, the situation is reversed; the scale of
value is more entrenched than the rankings of actors in the market. In a status market
actors need to know about the other actors involved as there is no scale of value for
evaluating the items traded in the market independently of its buyers and sellers. In a
standard market it is more important to know how to meet the standard in relation to
which all items traded are valued. The article includes empirical examples and four
testable hypotheses.
Economic sociology has largely neglected the issue of knowledge. There is a
discussion on the so-called knowledge economy (e.g., Powell and Snellman 2004)
that is connected to what Bell (1973) wrote on knowledge (Frank and Meyer 2007:
293–296). These and other works qualify labor as a factor of production by adding
knowledge as its central component. The knowledge-economy discussion focuses
on, for example, work organization, technology, and the role of patents. Fewer
studies address the role of knowledge in the economy (but see Barry and Slater
2005; Hayek 1945), though there is of course much to say on this topic at a general
level (Steiner 2005).
Economists have written on forms of knowledge in the economy (e.g.,
Geanakoplos 1992), and on information and knowledge in markets (Akerlof
1970). Akerlof showed that markets might not emerge if it is difficult to determine
the underlying quality of the items traded while only one side of the market
(typically the seller) has information about the items. This is an example of
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asymmetric information that jeopardizes the assumption of perfect information of
neoclassical economics, as elaborated by Knight (1921).
This article targets what is often seen as the core of the economy, namely markets
(Swedberg 1994, 2005), and it discusses the knowledge actors need to operate in
them, focusing on valuation. There are economic sociological studies that raise the
issue of valuation in markets (Aspers 2005; Beckert and Rössel 2004; Callon 1998;
Smith 1981, 1989, 2007; Velthuis 2005; White 1981). In my view, valuation is a
useful entry point also for examining the question of knowledge in markets.
My purpose is to contribute to the analysis of knowledge in markets. This
demands that markets are discussed in some detail. I outline two types of markets,
called status and standard markets, and argue that actors need different kinds of
knowledge to operate in them. This article makes three contributions. The first is the
distinction between types of markets. The second is the discussion of knowledge and
codified knowledge. The third, and most unique, contribution of this article concerns
how market types are connected to forms of knowledge, which means that I indicate
a possible bridge between the literature on markets and the one on knowledge. The
article starts with a discussion of markets. The next large section is on knowledge,
which is followed by examples of the two kinds of markets and the corresponding
knowledge in the markets. Before concluding, I present four testable hypotheses.
Market distinctions
In everyday language, we may talk of “financial,” “producer,” or “consumer”
markets. Economists often speak of kinds of markets based on the commodity of the
market, such as “monopoly” and “monopolistic” commodities, and the
corresponding markets.1 The sociological discussion on markets has made progress
since the first steps were taken in the early 1980s (Fligstein and Dauter 2007; Lie
1997; Smelser and Swedberg 2005; White 1981). Sociological research onmarkets, in
contrast to the economic research that focuses on the objects traded, aims to understand
markets by focusing on the interplay between the social structure and what is traded (that
is, commodities or services). A market can be seen as “a social structure for exchange of
rights, which enables people, firms and products to be evaluated and priced. This means
that at least three actors are needed for a market to exist; at least one actor, on one side of
the market, who is aware of at least two actors on the other side whose offers can be
evaluated in relation to each other” (cf. Aspers 2006b: 427). This definition suggests
that the market structure consists of two roles (buyer and seller), each standing on one
side of the market facing the other side. The two roles have different goals, “to sell at a
high price” and to “buy at a low price” (Geertz 1992: 226). The items are traded
because it is in the market actors’ interest (Swedberg 2003) to get something from the
1 There are other forms of goods, such as positional and nonpositional goods, and standardized and non-
standardized goods. Positional goods depend on how desirable they are in comparison to substitutes, or in
other words goods whose “value depends relatively strongly on how they compare with things owned by
others” (Frank 1985: 101). Nonpositional goods do not depend on this kind of relative value.
Differentiated goods are those that are different from each other, in contrast to non-differentiated or
standard goods, which are homogenous.
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market, for example money or goods. Valuation implies the possibility of comparison
and competition, which are essential components of markets. Though market
competition includes struggle (Simmel 1923: 216–232), it is a peaceful form of
interaction (Weber 1922:383, 1968:17). A market has a name, and its boundaries can
be regulated or determined by the cognitive similarity of actors and their perceptions
(Kennedy 2005; Rosa et al. 1999).
Some conditions must be fulfilled before one can talk of a market. Jens Beckert
(2007) has identified three problems of coordination that must be solved before there
can be a market. The first coordination problem is the value of what is traded, the
second is the organization of competition, and the third is how market actors
cooperate. I agree with Beckert on the importance of the value problem, since actors
must agree on what is being traded; a car cannot be sold at the stock exchange, and
neither can gold, but stocks can. The second coordination problem, in my view, is to
determine the rules of the market. This refers to the culture and the informal as well
as formal institutional structure of the market. The focus here is only on the
particular conditions of markets, though these too ultimately draw on the lifeworld
(Husserl 1992). Market cultures are often the same in many different markets, which
is to say that one can talk of a general market culture. The culture of the market also
refers to the language, the special meaning of the terms used, as well as the history
and narrative of the market. A market also has “rules” for “how to do things here,”
which also covers what are called “rules of exchange” (Fligstein and Mara-Drita
1996). A market culture makes it possible for people to predict how they can, and
how others will, act. Once the right market—defined by its culture and the object
traded—is “identified,” the items traded must be evaluated and priced, but how can
actors actually do this? To address this issue is in my view the third coordination
problem that must be solved in a market. I will say less about the emergence of
prices in markets, and instead focus on the relationship between the valuations of the
things traded in markets and the knowledge that actors need in order to operate in
these markets. This undertaking, however, is important also for understanding how
prices are set, as market prices presuppose valuation.
Given that a market is separated from other markets and non-markets, there are
two kinds of markets, standard and status (Aspers 2008), each with its own way of
“valuation.” I argue that this is the central distinction to be made in markets because
it includes both what is traded in the market, a commodity or a service, and the
social structure. The distinction between status and standard markets is also
inherently social, and does not fall into the materialistic trap and make distinctions
based on the objects traded, nor into the ontological trap of realism and assume that
there is a social world “out there” just waiting to be discovered. The point is to see
how material and social relations are part of what is socially constructed. The main
point is that in a status market the rank orders of the actors on the two sides of the
market (buyers and sellers) are more entrenched, or taken for granted (Berger and
Luckmann 1991), social constructions than the underlying value that is used for
evaluating, whereas in a standard market the value underlying the standard is a more
entrenched social construction than the ranks of actors on the market. All social
constructions are entrenched, but to different degrees, so that some constructions can
be the basis for others. These two theoretical ideal-type markets are mutually
exclusive. Obviously, no empirical market will be a pure instance of any ideal type.
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Below I discuss standard and status markets at greater length in relation to examples
and the kind of knowledge actors need in them.
Standard market
In a standard market a scale of value serves as a valuation order regarding a certain
product or service. The corresponding everyday term is often quality. Value can be
defined as the determination and rating of a “thing.” This definition captures the
double nature of value; it is a way of separating things from one another, but it can
also be used for evaluating those things that are covered by value. In the latter case
one can speak of a scale of value, or a set of characteristics, which is distinguishable
and that can be used in evaluating material and non-material things, such as people
and actions. This scale of value is a component of standard markets (Marshall 1920:
257). The characteristics of things are seen historically as inherent in what is being
evaluated, and this together with the scale means that things and people can be
evaluated independently of each other (Farris 1960:855; Reeves and Bednar 1994).2
From a social constructivist perspective, the things evaluated do not have essential
characteristics; it is enough that they are taken for granted so that they can be
unambiguously evaluated according to the scale. The standard market is centered on
certain characteristics, or as some would say “quality conventions” (Favereau et al.
2002). Given this, a vertical differentiation of products can be created based on the
quality scale (the value). The differentiation can be carried out with a continuous
quality scale or one with discrete steps. That a standard is used for evaluation does
not imply that producers in a market offer identical products. In monopolistic
competitive markets many sellers, who often also are producers, differentiate by
offering different products, which means that they thereby gain identities and create
market niches (Chamberlin 1948; Kirzner 1973; White 1981, 2002). Also, a
monopolistic competitive market can be a standard market if cohesion is based on
the underlying quality standard (Callon et al. 2002; Favereau et al. 2002:213),
though producers meet this standard to different degrees using slightly different
means (White 1992:29, 2002:78–79).
Both the neoclassical model presented by Knight (1921), and Marshall’s
(1920:256–258) model of “organized markets,” assume homogenous commodities.
These markets are instances of what I call standard market. The difference is that the
neoclassical market model assumes, as it were, only one value. One may in this case
speak of binary categories. Only identical commodities are traded in the market;
other items have to be traded in other markets.
The standard that a value represents in a market has to be perceived and used by
actors, so that “consumers [and producers] agree on quality variations” (Banks
1963:1368). In other words, “A good quality standard for any product should be
built on characteristics that users of the product recognize and consider important”
(Noles and Roush 1962:21). Both consumers and producers take part in the
construction of these standards. To be in the market both buyers and sellers share the
2 This is true of markets as well as of, for example, handwriting (Manuel 1915:269).
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idea of its standard, or, in other words, quality. This latter idea resembles what is
argued by the French school of the economics of conventions (Boltanski and
Thévenot 2006; Woolsey Biggart and Beamish 2003:455–457). Although standards
do not have to be written, or directly measurable by objective means, what is traded
in this market is a more entrenched social construction than the social order of
market actors.3
A standard market cannot, as economists (e.g., Barzel 2004) tend to do, be
reduced to the commodity, as any market is also about its actors. In a market ordered
by standard, market actors are positioned in relation to each other as a result of how
well they perform according to the established scale of valuation, that is, the
standard. In this type of market, it matters little who the actors are. What matters is
what they do. If there is a standard entrenched in the market, actors on both sides of
the market orient themselves primarily to this, though as mentioned, with different
interests (as seller or buyer).
What empirical markets can be understood with the help of this ideal-type market?
Brent crude oil is an example of a highly standardized product that is sold in a market
that resembles the “perfect” market, as presented in neoclassical textbooks.4 This
market is perfect because the standard makes the objects traded, “barrels of Brent
crude oil,” identical. Moreover, it does not matter who the producer is as long as it is
Brent crude oil. Consequently, competition in this standard market is focused on price.
One may here talk of a market price as economists do. One consequence is that firms
can be profitable essentially only by reducing costs (White 2002).
Standard markets, moreover, include, for example, commodity markets in which
the scale of value is clear and entrenched, such as the “natural standards” of cotton
and wool, as described by Alfred Marshall (1920:56–57). A cotton producer can
know what standard he or she produces before entering the market. By checking the
price on the commodity exchange, the producer also knows the economic value of
what is produced, given that prices are fairly stable in the short run or that there is a
future market. That the product is standardized, moreover, is a condition for future
markets. Standardized products are the implicit condition of global price competi-
tion, which, for example, has been the case with wheat since the first quarter of the
twentieth century (Marshall 1920:258–268).
Standards are common in technology-driven industries (Schmidt and Werle
1998), which also means that one finds many standard markets in these industries.
However, standards are not only restricted to commodities with a material base. A
taxi journey between a given city and airport can be seen as a standardized service,
and flat rates for some trips are evidence of this. Other markets, such as the market
for pulp and other highly standardized products, are best analyzed using the idea of a
“standard” market.
3 In some markets goods are traded that are clearly identifiable, and one may then talk of a standard
market because of the standardized product. A standardized product is “made with a known, widely
diffused production technology in which quality is so widely attainable that competition comes inevitably
to be centered on price” (Storper 1997:109). Quality standards, moreover, enable people to communicate,
trade, and calculate (Barzel 2004; Favereau et al. 2002) which makes them more like standards of time,
weight, and so on (Wilson 2000:57).
4 The fact that states, as significant suppliers, may affect the market price does not, however, affect the
constitution of the product.
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The existence of a scale makes it possible for actors to identify the quality of what
they produce in relation to the standard, and indirectly in relation to others. The
market for gold mines is one example that can clarify this point. The percentage of
pure gold in ore determines, given the chemical composition, whether it is profitable
to begin extraction at the investigated site. To decide whether it is profitable to open
a mine in an area or not is obviously contingent on the associated costs (of labor, and
so on), and the expected market price. Marshall (1920:256–258) discusses how one
can gain knowledge of goods that are not quickly perishable by measuring and
evaluating them by means of numbers so that “quality” can be determined
independently of the tester.
To talk of a standard market is not to say that the standard is set in stone; it is a
social construction that can be reconstructed. The standard, however, is at least a
more taken for granted social construction than the order of the actors on the two
sides of the market interface. What happens if there is no scale, or value, that can be
used to measure “quality”? Can there still be a market?
Status market
In a status market, it is not the value used for evaluation that is the most entrenched
social construction, but the social structure made up of the actors who have identities
on the two sides of the market. In fact, this ideal type of market lacks a scale of value
that is independent of its actors.
The notion of status used here resembles, and partly draws on, the influential notion
used by Podolny, though the two are not identical. He (Podolny 2005) essentially sees
status as something that is “in” the objects (people or things). Podolny’s usage is
understandable given that his reasoning is based on ontological realism. He seems to
think that there is a rank order based on a standard behind the status rank order.
Podolny’s approach does not open up to co-constitution of actors’ identities and what
is traded. In my view, the actors, and what is traded in the market, are co-constituted,
which suggests that “quality” orders must also be included in the analysis.
The participants in the market, sellers and buyers alike, must direct their focus to
the social structure made of identities that are related to each other. In other words,
by having a stable social structure of identities with positions that are fixed in
relation to each other, which make up a status hierarchy, the market overcomes the
problem of asymmetry that Akerlof (1970) raises.5 Other economists, such as
Spence (2002), have stressed that signaling resolves at least some cases of
asymmetric information. Spence (2002) argues that employees who declare that
they have a certain level of education can communicate to employers that they have
invested in education, which signals that they are productive. It is interesting,
however, that the signal—education—need not itself be substantiated, as long as it
operates as a proxy for productivity. Akerlof, Spence, and Podolny agree that there is
an underlying quality of what is traded in the market that can ultimately be
5 Asymmetric information, however, is important only when it “leads to uncertainty about what the other
agents are doing” (Geanakoplos 1992:56). Akerlof (1970:499–500) points also to the role of “brand
names” as a “counteracting institution” to the uncertainty of the quality.
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determined. In their cases quality is represented in the “quality of the car,”
“productivity,” and “capacity of investment banks” respectively. The conditions for
knowing these “internal” values of what is offered in the market, however, are not
fulfilled in a status market, which takes us back to the social structure.
In a status market, the rank orders of the actors—that is, the interrelated status
position of buyers and sellers—replace the standard and create order in the market over
time. What is traded in this kind of market is a function of the participating actors. This
means that when high-status sellers and high-status buyers come together, what they
trade “becomes,” rather than “is,” of high value. A further consequence is that the
information problem of the “quality” of the product cannot be solved by observation of
the items traded, due to the lack of an independent scale of measurement.
How do actors gain these positions in the social structure of status positions? Let us
begin by looking at the actors who are either directly evaluated for what they are, or
indirectly for what they do. In status markets, actors differentiate what they offer. The
sellers, if we look at a traditional “downstreammarket” (White 2002), are endowed with
status in a process of valuation depending on what they offer. In this way, a vertical
status order is created out of the horizontal differentiation of what is offered; some
actors gain more status than others do. But how is this distribution accomplished?
The consumers usually constitute the economic audience that endows the producers
with status. Bourdieu says that the relationship to the audience “constitutes[s] one of
the bases for evaluating the producers and their products” (Bourdieu 1993:46; cf.
Zuckerman 1999). It is therefore the other side—the buyers—who make a call and
thus evaluate the offer. The result of this evaluation and status endowment is that
some sellers gain more status. Those who give status are normally not an anonymous
mass, though this is possible. There is often also an order based on status among the
consumers in a market.6 The value is in this case a function of the rank orders of the
identities of the market actors. What comes out of a status market is co-produced by
the actors who come together, and these interactions can be observed in the market
by its actors (White 2002). When this market interaction is reproduced over time a
social structure made up of the two sides is created or reinforced. Actors on each
side of the market, sellers (for example “producers”) and buyers (for example,
“ideal-type consumers”) respectively, are ranked in relation to each other. In this
way, two rank orders are generated, and not only one, as is the case if the consumers
are an anonymous mass.
What is the consequence of this social structure? What an actor does, produces, or
“gives off,” to use Goffman’s ([1963] 1968:13) phrase, in a status market is a
function of his or her market identity, which must be connected to his or her status
position in the relevant social structure. In other words: in this type of market it
matters who one is, which one cannot separate from position in the social structure.
Although it may appear odd that market actors’ identities—for example, the set of
firms selling a product, and the ideal-type consumers who play the role of buyers in
the market—are considered to be stable in relation to each other, it is important to
remember that these orders are at least more stable than the value, that is, the
6 The origin of this order is only partly related to interaction in the market; but it may be constructed in
other markets and non-markets in which status is distributed and generated, though the interrelation of
markets is an issue that is outside the scope of this article.
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standard, of what is traded in the market. Status and standard refer to the relative
entrenchment of the items traded and the social structure of traders in the market.
As the rank order of actors in status markets is more stable than what they give off
(for example, produced commodities), it is more difficult than in a standard market
for actors to know what to do well (for example, to move up the status ladder). Only
when actors are in the market and present what they offer can they truly know the
“value” of what they have done. In a status market, actors orient themselves to each
other, in particular to those with high-status because they represent “quality” or, in
broader terms, what is valued in this market. A further consequence is that in the
economy, which is future oriented, there are no future status markets in which risks
can be hedged, which leads to more uncertainty. Moreover, sellers who gain much
status can set higher prices on their products or services (Podolny 2005). In fact,
prices in a pure ideal-type status market would simply reflect actors’ status, which is
to say that high-status sellers would set higher prices for their products.
Let us look at an example of a status market. If a well-known jewelry designer
turns the gold that she bought on the gold market into a piece of “art,” this piece has
to be valued in relation to the status of the designer. It must be said that it is not the
number of hours of work that is put into the jewelry that matters, as Marx argued;
anyone can spend hours making jewelry, but the items will still not be the same as
those of the “artist.” It is what the actors in the market value that matters. The very
idea of artist is here connected to the social system that produces artists, that is, “art
worlds” (Becker 1982). In this case, buyers operate as an audience that values what
the different players on the stage make. Although the value of the piece of gold
depends on the gold price, which is determined in the standard market for the metal
gold, it has become a piece of “art” because people who are recognized as the
audience, and of course others too, evaluate what artists do. It is in the status market
that a significant value is added to the metal. In this social process, some actors gain
more status than others.
In somemarkets—for example, the fashion model market (e.g., Entwistle 2002)—the
side made up of the fashion agencies evaluates and determines what “good looks”
actually means. This the actors also do, of course, with the help of their customers,
such as photographers, but essentially without any direct influence from the models
and those who want to become models. This means that models, and in particular those
who want to become models, are critically scrutinized by model agencies. There are
demands, such as being within a certain height bracket, 175–183 cm, which is a
standard for female models. But few women will meet this requirement in combination
with the high demands concerning the appearance of their faces and bodies. However,
the look that is demanded is subject to fashion, which means that “quality,” in essence,
is a function of what the people working for the agencies think looks good for the time
being. It is not really possible to know what people will think and like 2 years from
now; the closest one may get is the partly performative and partly forward looking
work of trend analysts and others trying to forecast trends.
Status markets can, for example, be found where aesthetic judgments are common
(Warde 2002:192). Today, not only fashion garment markets (Crane and Bovone
2006), art markets (Velthuis 2005), and markets for photographers (Aspers 2005)
could be seen as “status” markets, but also markets for cars, furniture, art, and many
other “markets” could be analyzed using this idea.
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The two kinds of markets
Before discussing the role of knowledge, I summarize the two types of markets
discussed above. Figure 1 illustrates standard and status markets, and the different
orientations that characterize them.
The distinction between status and standard markets is analytic. Thus, though
reality comes in shades, there is an analytic threshold (Granovetter 1978) between
the two forms of ideal-type markets, that is, either the social structure or the value
(standard) is the most entrenched social construction. There is, so to speak, a
necessary tipping point at the ideal level of analysis, where the one side becomes,
relatively speaking, more entrenched than the other.
Can one find evidence of tipping points of this kind? To identify the exact time
and place of the tipping from one to the other kind of market demands detailed
empirical research, but there is evidence that this has happened, for example, in the
garment industry. The contemporary final consumer market for fashion garments in
Western countries is best understood as a status market (Aspers 2008). This,
however, has not always been the case in the fashion market. The final consumer
market in the past was most likely ordered according to the principle of standard.
Balkin’s (1956) detailed description of the production of raincoats suggests that this
market was not oriented to fashion, but to production, quality, and pricing, that is, to
a production standard. Though demand of course also changed in those days, it is
reasonably clear that competition was price-centered, and no reference to brands or
anything that even resembles firm’s identities or niches, or status in markets is
mentioned that would indicate that this was a status market (of course, with haute
couture as an exception). In addition, other studies suggest that the final consumer
market for garments used to be a standard market (Gregory 1948:71).
Knowledge
What are the knowledge conditions of markets? My point is that this question must
come second to the question of the kind of market that one is studying. The
distinction between status and standard is fundamental for analyzing and
Standard Market Status Market
Buyer BuyerSeller Seller
Fig. 1 The relation between
value and structure in standard
and status markets (ideal types).
The bold lines represent the
strongest (more entrenched) so-
cial construction in each of the
markets, and the dotted lines
represent the weakest. The
arrows indicate the direction of
valuation
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understanding the different kinds of knowledge needed in markets. What, then, is the
connection between forms of markets and kinds of knowledge?
Knowledge, in contrast to information (Amsden 2001), is based on interpreta-
tion.7 Interpretation draws on the lifeworld and, more concretely, on the
preunderstanding of the interpreter (Heidegger 2001:152–153).8 Knowledge is here
defined as “having the capacity to do what it takes in a situation.” The definition
stresses that knowledge is connected to situations and contexts, and that actors must
interpret the situations they are in, and that knowledge does not have general
applicability. This acknowledges the symbolic interactionist idea that meanings
emerge in situations, and that knowledge cannot be conceptualized as transposable
atoms ready to be used. Fredrik Barth (1995:66) sees knowledge as a “modality of
culture.” The definition I propose covers codified knowledge and various forms of
embodied, practical, and tacit knowledge (Aspers 2006a).
Knorr Cetina (1999), too, stresses the importance of the situation when she talks
of knowledge. She does not, as some do, see knowledge as “statements of scientific
belief, as technological application, or perhaps intellectual property.” Her definition
“switches the emphasis to knowledge as practiced—within structures, processes, and
environments that make up specific epistemic settings” (Knorr Cetina 1999:8). In her
view, knowledge is connected to specific settings that can have their own culture. A
central aspect of knowledge in this article is that it can be more or less codified. This
is to say that it can partly be documented and partly transferred with the help of
language, as Schütz’s (1964) notion “stock of knowledge” indicates. I now look at
the two kinds of markets to find out what role for and what kind of knowledge each
of them demands.
Knowledge in standard markets
A standard market implies that actors know the standard, which informs them
what the market demands. Let us take the production of axles of a certain
tolerance that will form part of an engine as an example of a market in which
both buyers (“customers”) and sellers (“machine shops”) can orient themselves to
the standard. In this market buyers ask for bids to make axles, and let machine
tool shops reply with offers that state that they will deliver the finished product
on a certain date and according to the demands of the buyer, and at a certain
price that may differ between those replying with bids for the order. One can
here talk of an absolute quality (standard) given the required steel quality used to
manufacture the axles. To know what it takes to produce these fine machine
axles is “simple”; the turner in the machine tool shop who makes them using a
7 It should be pointed out that the problem addressed in this article does not concern information.
Information may be almost perfect in a market but knowledge is a matter of how this information is used.
8 The general idea of knowledge, traceable to ancient Greece, is an agreement between thought and reality
(e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1991:1; Smith 1895:32). There are, of course, many forms of knowledge,
which cannot be discussed here. It is, for example, clear that the body is a knowing instrument (Crick
1982:300), and there are various forms of tacit or embodied knowledge (Bourdieu 1977:2–3, 1990:52;
Giddens 1984:328, 375).
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lathe only has to look at the blueprint (which is made using a number of
standardized symbols that refer to yet other standards) to know the size, surface
finish, and other conditions of production. When the axle is finished, the product
can be measured to see if its size is within the tolerance allowed, or above or
below the exact dimensions of what the blueprint demands. To measure this one
can use tools that are standardized against yet other standards (ultimately, the
definition of length).
This entire work process is codified in terms of standards to which all
turners can orient themselves. One part of this standard can be observed in
Fig. 2, namely the angles of the cutting tools if high-speed steel or carbide cutting
tools are used. In this kind of market, actors can control whether their products
meet the quality standards before they enter it. This also means that turners
primarily do not have to orient themselves to other turners; the standard is
enough.9
Hence, given the type of steel quality of the axle, and the surface finish that is
demanded, machine tool manufacturers inform the turner about what tool to use, and
what speed (r.p.m.), how much he can feed his tool against the material, and how
deep he can cut. Few non-turners could manage to produce axles within a tolerance.
But the important thing is that the difficulties, which I would be the last to
underestimate, are nonetheless of a basic character for a turner; it has to do with
knowing what a lathe is, how to handle it, and learning the concepts necessary to
talk about it. Essentially, to be a turner is to know these things. Given his
knowledge, a turner can make use of codified knowledge to perform a combination
of operations that he has never done before, and still be fairly confident that the
result will be what he expects (that is, meeting the standard). I have not included
here the issue of price, which of course is also central in this market, but it is
possible to calculate the cost of production of the axles given knowledge of the
material and the labor costs, as well as other costs.
In the above example, there is one reference point, entrenched in other standards,
but not a scale. In many markets there is a gliding scale, so that there is a scale of
value, and what is valued may score higher or lower in relation to it. Farming, to
take another example, has developed product standards over a long period of time.
To talk of grades is to refer to a scale divided into discrete steps. The market for eggs
is no exception. There are egg standards (Banks 1963; Gaumnitz 1933; Jacob et al.
2002) that began to be developed in the United States in 1923 (Noles and Roush
1962:21). These are based on internal and external characteristics of eggs. Expert
users of eggs were asked, and it has been confirmed that their evaluations of real
eggs correspond to the official egg quality standard (Noles and Roush 1962). The
egg standard—and here I rely only on the Californian standard—is quite
complicated (Jacob et al. 2002). It is based on observations: for example, whether
there are blood or meat spots in the eggs, which makes them eggs of inferior
9 There are, however, also non-standardized steel qualities. Steel quality is determined by the amount of
material blended with iron, but also by tests of hardness and strength. Thus, even though “everyone”
knows the tolerance of axles for the engine, which is required by a turner, it is not possible to produce this
if the lathe is not good enough, or of equal importance, if the tools to measure the size of the axles are not
available.
Theor Soc (2009) 38:111–131 121
quality.11 This standard is expressed in words, and it is made for professionals and
non-professionals alike. The standard, and the orientation to what an egg is and how
to rate it, is then “independent” of consumers and producers. One may say that it is
enough for an egg producer to know the standard to produce eggs of a certain
Fig. 2 Information on standards in relation to angles for cutting tools of high–speed steel. It provides
suggestions concerning how to prepare cutting tools, given the material on which the turner works10
11 The United States standard when the study was conducted, for example, did not recognize the presence
of chalazae—the two membranous twisted strings by which the yolk is bound to the ends of the shell—
though it was mentioned by the housewives included in the study. But even though this was mentioned, it
did not affect their rating of the eggs (Noles and Roush 1962:24).
10 This illustration is old, but though the industry has developed computerized lathes, many lathes more
than 30 years old are still in use, and cutting tools are still made of high-speed steel.
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quality. Calculability (Callon 1998) and price formation connected to the different
qualities are conditions for stock exchanges and future markets in eggs (Brown
1933), as well as many other items.
The knowledge needed in a standard market is primarily oriented to the standards,
which, so to speak, are sedimentations of human interaction and struggle. But once
the standard is taken for granted, the need for social interaction diminishes.
Knowledge in status markets
In a status market, as indicated by the gold designer example, the knowledge needed
is of a different kind. One may say that there are few standards, material or
immaterial, to which actors can orient themselves. How do actors in this kind of
situation come to grips with the world and, more concretely, what is knowledge in
this kind of market? Let us look at the case of fashion.
The consumer market for fashion is a good example of a market in which there
are no product standards (Aspers 2008), as Simmel already noted: “The absolute
indifference of fashion to the material standards of life is well illustrated by the way
in which it recommends something appropriate in one instance, something abstruse
in another, and something materially and aesthetically quite different in a third”
(Simmel 1971:297–298).
Fashion is a function of actors coming together from the two sides of the market,
sellers and buyers (Bovone 2006). In this market, each side is a rather stable social
rank order, so that there are firms and consumers who are more in fashion, and who
essentially define fashion (McCracken 1988). These actors have much status. There
are other actors, on both sides, who interact with each other, but who are “out of
fashion” and have little status.
Thus, fashion is made when high-status garment sellers’ garments, for example
from Prada or Dior, are purchased and worn by well-known consumers, such as
wives of soccer players and other celebrities. For this reason celebrities are
sometimes given clothes, or they are sold them at a discount, in order to bring
status to the brand. The essence of fashion is to be first with the latest, and fashion
trends change very quickly. Fashion trends, which of course are manifested in
products, change more rapidly than the status order of actors. Given that the nature
of fashion is constant change, the individual garments matter less. It follows that if
an actor has “knowledge” of what is in fashion today, this knowledge will be of
only “historical” value 3 months later. This, as stated above, means that one cannot
talk of a standard that actors orient themselves to, but one can talk of a social
structure that is stable. The knowledge that actors in a fashion market have cannot
be oriented directly to the products, while they are not determined by a scale of
value (or a fixed value when we talk of homogenous products). Thus, though
different types of fabrics are sometimes seen as “better” than others, this is not a
universal condition. One cannot conclude that a silk suit is intrinsically more
valuable than one made from wool or cotton. It has more to do with whether it is
fashionable or not, and the historically determined values of material; to decide this
calls for information on who produced it, and who wears it, and knowledge of how
to interpret this information.
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Actors in this market have to orient themselves towards each other to look for
clues about what to do in their situation. If they are in a fashion market, they have to
know what is the most entrenched social construction, that is, the names of designers
and their status order. To know the market also implies understanding the
movements within the market, being in touch with the market to pick up the latest
trends, and learning who is about to be “out” and who is climbing up the status
ladder. Knowledge in this market is knowing about the social structure and how its
“game” of positioning and mobility in the market and the industry at large is played
and communicated.
It is difficult for both producers and consumers to know what is going on in this
market. Producers use market research to try to get to know and understand their
customers (Aspers 2006a). A problem here, of course, is that fashion is about the
future and not about the past. Fashion means to provide customers with commodities
that they, so to speak, do not know about until they are surprised by them in the
store. This suggests that they have to use other means to understand their customers.
To obtain knowledge about the market, firms can, for example, use analysts
(Abernathy 1999:88–106; Davis 1992:129) and trend forecasters (Brannon 2005).
They may also attend different fairs (Skov 2006)—some with trend seminars that
provide information about future fashion trends. Magazines, stylists, and gossip are
additional ways of obtaining information on, or at least an idea of what colors and
fabrics are most likely to be in vogue.
Firms, however, do not merely passively respond to the social facts of fashion.
They can also create trends, by advertisement, but also by “coordination.” Fashion
producers collaborate on colors, but also on trends, to be “right” in the future.
Business actors come together before the season to talk, and in some cases
determine, what they will stress in their fashion lines. One may thus speak of an
element of performativity in the market (Callon 1998, 2007).
The crucial issue in this market is not information—that is, to detect the
multitude of signals that are intentionally and unintentionally, and constantly,
emitted in social life—but knowledge to select the relevant information and to
interpret it. Actors cope with uncertainty (Knight 1921) in this situation, too, in
which they cannot be guided by standards, by orienting themselves only to the
manifest, but still stable, social construction of the market, namely the order of
actors. The market, in summary, lacks a standard, and it is the social structure of
identities, or, as business economists say, brands, on the one hand, and the ideal-
type consumers, on the other hand, that make up the order of the market. These
market identities, in one sense more than the concrete products that are traded,
make up the market.
Predictions
In the two preceding sections I argued that there are different forms of markets. I
also discussed knowledge in these markets. Valuation has been to the fore in the
discussion. In this section, I make predictions in the form of four hypotheses about
knowledge, based on the different market structures. The examples I give are not
intended to provide evidence concerning the hypotheses. There are two additional
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reasons, besides the possibility of testing them, for presenting these hypotheses: to
make the ideas easier to understand and apply.
H1 Actors in status markets orient themselves to each other.
This hypothesis corresponds to the second. In a status market actors can keep
track only of a limited number of actors, for example, sellers (White 2002).12 To
obtain knowledge about their peers—for example, rival producers—firms must keep
track of each other. Actors must stay “in the game” so that customers are aware of
them (Faulkner 1983). This also suggests that closeness is more important in status
markets than in standard ones because the orientation is to actors.
Closeness, and the possibility of interaction, however, cannot be directly
translated into spatiality. It is much more the phenomenological closeness that
matters (Knorr Cetina 2002).13 Hence, gossip and other forms of information
exchange can be facilitated by networks on the Internet or by physical vicinity.
Closeness is a constitutive characteristic of clusters or industrial districts (Pratt 2002;
Scott 2005:117–137), though these are not constructed out of physical-logistic
necessity, which is the case with some technical production districts (Knorringa
1995). That closeness is central in status markets stands in contrast to what is
characteristic of standard markets, namely that orientation to the standard implies
that actors can be more detached and need not talk to each other about the
commodity or service, which is more or less taken for granted. Observation of
competitors, market research, and market forecasting are examples of the strategies
that actors in all markets can use. This is one form of mutual orientation. They may
also create “alliances” or simply try to exchange status with actors on the other side
who are on the equivalent status level to them, or even better, who are above them.
Thus, one finds orientation to actors on the same side, but most likely to those on the
other side too, especially when one side endows actors on the other side with status.
H2 Gossip is central in status markets.
Gossip, which in my usage can have both positive and negative connotations, is
common in every industry. The information actors need to operate in a market,
however, comes not only from observations within the market, but is also obtained
“over luncheons with others in the trade, from trade associations, from one’s own
customers, and so on” (White 1981:519). This information is what White (1993:167,
1995:62) calls “gossip”. Information gathering and gossip is, however, of extra
importance if what is valued in a market depends on those who trade it. Thus, in
markets that are not based on codified knowledge, actors have to find out what is
going on, and what is good and bad, at the same time as they find out who the
important actors are. This idea of gossip has general support in the market
sociological literature (White 2002), but also from markets that are characterized by
12 According to White, this information problem is also a reason why a market seldom exceeds a dozen or
so producers; it is difficult to keep track of many competitors at the same time, and the risk of an unstable
market increases when this threshold is exceeded.
13 These ideas are similar to what geographers have identified, but differ in the way they are explained
(e.g., Bathelt et al. 2004). Geographers do not start with the market and use it as explanans. They tend to
focus on the empirical distinction “‘tacit=local’ versus ‘codified=global,’” as Bathelt et al. (2004:32)
critically note.
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status (Velthuis 2005). The need to gossip also makes social interaction among
members of the industry more important.
H3 Knowledge in standard markets is based on other standards.
Not only is knowledge in a standard market codified, but in order to be codified it
is likely to be based on other forms of codified (standardized) knowledge. Standards,
so to speak, have to be rooted, or based on other social constructions; they can at
least not exist outside of a specific context of taken-for-grantedness. As discussed
under Hypothesis 4, these standards can either have a social or a material base. In a
status market, in contrast, there is no codified knowledge to begin with, though one
can of course identify standards or conventions in all areas of life.
H4 Standards can be social.
This hypothesis is obviously restricted to standard markets. It is easy to think of
standards as based on technology, but technologies are just one way of standardizing
markets. Custom and social conventions can also be seen as “standards.”Max Weber
(1922:16–20) distinguishes between “Konvention,” which is similar to what we call
a norm, though he defines it in terms of “Sitte” (or tradition), and “Recht” (“law”).
Weber argues that the principle of Recht can be like a standard (for example,
“ethischer Maßstab”). Moreover, it has been shown in a study on the electricity
industry (Yakubovich et al. 2005) that technical standards can form the basis of
pricing in markets. These examples suggest that we should not theorize standards as
merely technological. If we disregard the sometimes more entrenched standards of
social norms, we also leave out the social process of establishing technological
standards, including their legitimacy (Werle and Iversen 2006). We must not reduce
standards to institutions, especially as status markets, too, would be institutions. We
cannot, in other words, explain anything by means of a concept that includes
“everything.”
I have formulated these hypotheses as statements in relation to the two forms of
markets that I have discussed, status and standard (see Fig. 3). The proposed
hypotheses already have some support, but more research is needed to adjudicate on
their predictive and explanatory value.
 Market 
Knowledge aspects Status Standard
The role of gossip High Moderate
Orientation to other market actors High Low 
Social base High  Low 
Codified knowledge (documented in
text and technologies) 
Difficult Easy 
Fig. 3 A summary of the four hypotheses on knowledge, given the market type
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It is possible to make the analysis more detailed and to look at how the two sides
of the markets, buyers and sellers, are affected by the market structure. I have
discussed the role of identity in markets, and it follows that the more an actor is
identified with a market, the more important the market is for him or her. This may
appear a trivial statement, but it has consequences for how much an actor should
invest in knowledge. In a market, the side, buyers or sellers, that gains its identity
from this interaction will also invest, relatively speaking, most to get to know the
market. In the majority of real markets—for example, producer markets (White
2002)—the sellers will be those who are mostly identified with the market. Buyers in
such a market, in contrast, also operate in many other markets as buyers, and invest
less time and effort to know this market. This is a general idea about knowledge that
applies to both status and standard markets.
Conclusion
The starting point of this article is that knowledge is a neglected issue in economic
sociology. The argument is in line with those who talk of the importance of knowledge
in society and in the economic sphere, but this literature is abstract, and it is not very
fruitful to use vague notions, such as “knowledge society.” I have, in contrast, focused
on knowledge in relation to smaller social units, namely the partial orders of markets.
It has been argued that one has to consider the market structure to understand what
knowledge means in the contexts in which a specific kind of knowledge is applicable.
The central contribution of this article is the notion that knowledge in the
economy must be understood in relation to market structure. This statement is a
result of an attempt to combine the literature on markets with that on knowledge.
The rationale behind this idea is that the complexity of society cannot be handled at
the level of different spheres, which Weber (1946), for example, discusses. Smaller
units are needed to combine a phenomenologically correct description with scientific
explanations based on understanding, and I have stressed the role of markets as
smaller and more tangible units of analysis. I also hope that this article can help to
bridge two literatures, the literature dealing with standards (e.g., Brunsson and
Jacobsson 2000), and the economic market sociological literature.
The distinction made between status and standard markets is profound. Although
real markets are always blends of the two ideal types, there is a tipping point, so that
either the social structure or what is traded is the most entrenched social
construction. Depending on the kind of market, there are different knowledge
conditions. The article presents four predictions that connect knowledge and the
economy that are to be tested in real markets. These predictions are conditioned by
the market structure, and can be used to explore further the black box labeled
“market mechanism” by economists.
The two concepts of market and knowledge connect to perhaps the most acute
question of economic actors, namely how to overcome uncertainty. Markets are
ways of coordinating economic transactions, and this coordination generates at least
partial order. But there is also great uncertainty within markets, which, I have
argued, cannot be understood unless one also brings in the notion of knowledge. To
have a better understanding of the role of knowledge is crucial for the discussion of
Theor Soc (2009) 38:111–131 127
how standards are playing an increasing role in the work of organizing and
managing uncertainty by creating calculable risks (Power 2007) in markets.
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